NATCA Bookshelf

describing what DVAs are, their purpose, and air traffic's responsibility when assigning headings within the DVA. Generally, ATC can vector departing aircraft and those executing a missed approach below the MVA using DVAs under certain conditions. Because DVAs are not widely used and often the guidance was misapplied, changes were made to FAA publications to clarify the use of DVAs. In some cases, airports have published SIDs along with a DVA which have differing climb gradients that the pilot must fly. Issuing a SID from clearance delivery and then issuing an initial heading with the takeoff clearance causes confusion among some flight crews as to what gradient should be flown. AJV8 and departure criteria experts are continuing to discuss ways to write procedures to help clarify expectations when utilizing the published DVA. Remote Tower Requirements – Adam Rhodes, NATCA Article 114 Rep, and I are working with the Agency to determine sight requirements for Remote Tower operations. We have participated in several workshops determining what is a "must" for ATC and what "should" be visible using a camera at a remote tower. There is only one remote tower currently in use at Leesburg, Va. (JYO), with another tower to be tested and evaluated at Fort Collins, Colo. (FNL). Wrong Surface Landings – The NAS experiences nearly one wrong surface arrival daily. This includes aircraft landing on the incorrect runway or landing on a taxiway. NATCA and AJV8 have been working on a document change proposal (DCP) to address procedures and phraseology when ATC recognizes an aircraft is aligned with the wrong surface. The change would include phraseology for verifying the correct runway and guidance for issuing a control action (most likely a go-around) to the aircraft. More often than not, ATC has allowed the operation to continue due to the "critical" phase of flight. The new guidance will require ATC to take action. 7110.65 2-6-4 – PIREPs have been and continue to be a "Top 5" issue for FAA Air Traffic Organization (ATO). Input from the FAA, NATCA, and AOPA, along with the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) was considered when new guidance was drafted for 7110.56, 2-6-4. When the change was published, the guidance was incorrect and would have required controllers to report ALL PIREPs, and notify surrounding sectors about each and every PIREP. This was never the agreed upon language for the change. NATCA was successful in removing the new guidance and reverting back to what was already contained in the 65. Parallel Runway Ops, 30-degree intercept and Visual Separation – For airports that have parallel runways separated by at least 2,500 feet, but less than 4,300 feet, and parallel runways greater than 4,300 feet apart, the use of a 30-degree intercept when conducting operations using 7110.65, 7-4-4 is required if the operation will result in less than approved separation. There have been many facilities interpreting this rule to require every aircraft to be assigned a 30-degree intercept, regardless of traffic on the parallel runway. Additionally, AJV 8 was tasked with writing an interpretation regarding the use of visual separation during parallel runway operations. The guidance that AJV 8 put out still requires a 30-degree intercept to final as currently written, but only if approved separation will not be maintained after both aircraft are established on their respective finals. Also, the use of visual separation is permitted during the turn on to final but under no circumstances will visual separation be used in lieu of the 30- degree intercept rule. AJV 8 sent the guidance to all three service areas, and the guidance should be disseminated to all facilities. Shutdown delays – Several safety risk management panels, multiple workgroup meetings and work on upcoming changes were put on hold during the government shutdown. Additionally, several changes within the Procedures Office have delayed some upcoming DCPs for changes to approach/departure hold requirements, radar identification methods, descend via and climb

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• SAFETY AND TECHNOLOGY DEPARTMENT