can be determined. 3nm Fusion in MEARTS also presents unique challenges to
contingency planning.
Terminal Fusion:
Greensboro did not transition to fusion as expected on July 6. Early on in testing,
an area of persistent stitching was identified along the southern portions of the airspace.
This problem continued to grow in area and consistency, and began to be accompanied
by some indications of split tracks in other areas. The problem was deemed serious
enough to warrant the facility holding off on fusion, and investigation further. That led to
the discovery of a bad antenna on the BI5 radar. The part will need to be replaced and
then the facility can re-evaluate fusion and determine a new transition date. This goes to
reinforce the idea that controllers need to remain persistent in their monitoring of
equipment that this radar problem was not a parameter normally monitored by tech ops,
and would have continued to get worse if not for the controller workforce speaking up.
There will be an important meeting involving AJV-7 and others to determine
whether any other safety analysis (SRMD) will be needed for the TDW pixel-setting fix to
proceed nationally.
P31 disabled the weather input from their main ASR 11 SRR until a part (on
order) is replaced
Vehicle ADS-B:
845 Equipped and operational vehicles at 16 airports.
Discussions have started regarding how to best monitor the operation and
compliance of Vehicle Transponders. There is currently no compliance monitoring of
any sort. The team has determined this is a significant issue and will focus on a solution.
Possible outreach briefings later this year could include SAN and MCO.
