NATCA Bookshelf

• Madison (MSN) ADS-B Flight Inspection 2/14 • Augusta (AGS) ADS-B IOC • Augusta (AGS) Fusion OSD 2/21 • Springfield IL (SPI) ADS-B/Fusion Kickoff 2/21 • Moses Lake (MWH) Fusion Operational 2/21 • Pasco (PSC) Fusion Operational 2/26 • Toledo (TOL) ADS-B Flight Inspection 2/28 • Champaign (CMI) Fusion OSD 2/28 • Eugene (EUG) Fusion Operational 3/1 • Madison (MSN) Fusion OSD 3/14 • Waco (ACT) ADS-B Flight Inspection 3/14 • Toledo (TOL) Fusion OSD 3/27 ADS-B Avionics Issues: An issue not screened by automation systems but an important assumption for future ADS-B dependent applications is the broadcast call sign of the user. ADS-B aircraft reports include this information, and automation systems compare it to the filed call sign. When a mismatch occurs a Call Sign Mismatch (CSMM) alert can be generated. The issue has been highlighted in Equip 2020 meetings since ADS-B dependent applications (CAVS, Advanced Interval Management, etc.) are dependent on this functionality. Monthly tracking continues to trend upward. The SBS Article 114 work group has recommended disabling CSMM alerts across all automation platforms. A flight test was conducted February 27 to examine the effect of ADS-B Duplicate ICAO Address on ERAM and STARS. Engineering assumptions have always been that when this condition occurs with two aircraft within 6nm, the SBS network would either drop the tracks, swap the tracks or other. The initial results of the flight test show the events are much more conservative. Test aircraft as far apart as 50nm were still dropped from the network and presented as radar only targets. This leads one to believe that Duplicate ICAO Address alerts are not worthwhile for controllers. NATCA SBS continues to work with the Agency toward a more proactive approach to ADS-B avionics issues that result in position error. Though these are infrequent occurrences, the Agency's ability to respond has been hampered by a lack of resources, bureaucracy, and legal constraints. These issues occur when standards for installation or configuration within aircraft or ground systems are not met. ADS-B is a cooperative surveillance source relying on the position information determined onboard the aircraft. Multiple ATSAP reports have been filed on the known issues to date. Controllers and facilities are encouraged to report any identified events through ATSAP and any other mechanism. In order to reduce the number of safety compromising events in the NAS an effective, efficient response mechanism is needed. The Agency has deployed additional mitigations including enhanced validation (EV) and a No Services Aircraft List (NSAL). The NSAL (aka "blacklist") is effective in dealing with chronic non-compliant aircraft, but it lacks the ability to respond quickly. As such it will likely always be needed as a backstop to compliance or enforcement issues. Any issue identified and reported immediately takes a minimum of one day to place the aircraft on the NSAL.

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